Transportation & Logistics

The freight chain moves money faster than it verifies who is asking for it

A load is tendered, a carrier is onboarded, an invoice is factored and a payment is released — often inside forty-eight hours, often between parties who have never met. That tempo is what makes freight work, and it is exactly what makes a look-alike domain worth registering. This page is about putting a DNS-verified list of currently-live phishing hosts in front of the moments where money and cargo change hands.

390,000+DNS-verified phishing domains, every one actively resolving
04:30 UTCWhen the rebuilt database lands, ready for the depot pull
Under 50msCheck response time, fast enough to sit inside a tender flow
100 per callDomains per batch request, at one lookup each
Freight payment & factoring
Carrier onboarding
Load boards & TMS
Depots & 3PL sites
Driver devices
Forwarders & customs
Home / Use Cases / Transportation & Logistics
Why this industry

Freight is a business of strangers transacting at speed

Most sectors phish badly because their staff are busy. Logistics phishes badly because its normal, correct, everyday behaviour is indistinguishable from the attack.

Consider what a broker's operations desk actually does in a shift. It receives load tenders from shippers it may have worked with twice, accepts capacity from carriers whose entire prior relationship is an MC number and a certificate of insurance emailed as a PDF, and exchanges rate confirmations, bills of lading and packet requests with a dozen counterparties nobody there will ever speak to on the phone. There is no version of that job in which "be suspicious of unexpected documents from unfamiliar parties" is workable advice, because unexpected documents from unfamiliar parties are the job.

Eight organisations per container

A single box from an inland factory to a distribution centre passes through a forwarder, an ocean carrier, a terminal, a drayage operator, a customs broker, a warehouse, a line-haul carrier and a last-mile fleet — most of them small, several with no IT function, all of them needing to talk to each other in writing.

The weakest link is the whole chain

An attacker never has to compromise the largest party. They take the least defended one, and from that point they send perfectly ordinary messages from a genuine address to everybody else. Third-party risk is not a governance abstraction in freight; it is a literal description of how the cargo moves.

The public has been trained to click

Carrier-branded tracking notices, exception alerts, customs-charge requests and redelivery links are among the most imitated messages in circulation precisely because they are so common nobody finds them remarkable — so the lure is not a trick to fall for, it is a plausible event that happens to be false.

Human judgement is the wrong control

At the moment of reading, the fraudulent message and the genuine one are identical. A list of hostnames verified as currently-live credential-harvesting infrastructure does not care how convincing the wording was, how real the deadline felt, or how many times the reader has done this before.

And it is operable by a two-person team. Most security architecture recommended to this industry assumes a security function, a managed device estate and a mature identity programme. A list you download once a day and load into a resolver you already run assumes none of those — which is why it is worth doing before anything more ambitious.
Payment diversion

Freight payment fraud is the loss that actually reaches the ledger

The characteristic freight fraud is not a dramatic breach. It is a remittance-detail change: a message arrives from a carrier, a factoring company or a forwarder saying banking details have been updated and the next settlement should go to a new account. It is well written, references a genuine load number, and lands at exactly the point in the settlement cycle when a change would be unremarkable.

Anatomy of a remittance change

A real load is referencedThe attacker has sight of a genuine shipment, usually from a compromised mailbox earlier in the chain, so the reference number checks out.
The domain is nearly rightA transposition or an inserted hyphen in the carrier's name, registered days earlier, resolving now, with mail configured and a matching landing page.
A portal link asks for confirmation"Confirm the updated remittance details in our vendor portal" — the harvesting page, and the hostname a batch check would flag.
Timing matches the cycleSent when a settlement run is genuinely due, so the request is expected rather than surprising.
Discovery is weeks lateThe real carrier chases an unpaid invoice long after the funds have moved and been layered away.

Variant one: the look-alike domain

One character transposed, a hyphen inserted, a different top-level domain — and a payables clerk who did not scrutinise the sender in a threaded conversation on a phone screen. This is the variant a verified phishing-domain check addresses directly and materially, because the hostile hostname is the thing being checked.

Variant two: the hijacked thread

The message comes from the genuine domain, because the counterparty's mailbox is compromised and the attacker is replying inside an existing conversation. A domain check does nothing here, and it would be dishonest to imply otherwise — that one needs callback verification to a number you already held, which is a process control rather than a technical one.

Where the check still helps upstream

The credential-harvesting page that took your counterparty's mailbox in the first place very often lives on a hostname already in this database. Adjacent patterns are covered on our supply chain and email security pages.

Implementation, in one sentence: a server-side batch call against the hostnames extracted from settlement correspondence, run as part of the payment-release job — not as a security tool somebody has to remember to open.
Identity theft, carrier edition

Double-brokering starts with a stolen login, not a stolen truck

Carrier identity theft has a specific mechanical shape. An attacker obtains the credentials or the operating identity of a legitimate carrier, presents that identity to a broker, accepts a load, and either re-brokers it to an unwitting third carrier while collecting the payment, or arranges for the freight to be collected and never delivered. The theft of the login precedes the theft of the cargo, sometimes by weeks.

Where hostnames enter the vetting record

The carrier's stated websiteScreened at packet submission and re-screened on the periodic review cycle, not only once at onboarding.
Certificate and authority linksAny URL supplied in place of an attachment, including shortened links resolved to their destination host first.
Domains in the contact addressesThe mail domain of every contact on the packet, checked as a set in a single batch call.
Change-of-detail requestsAny later request to update banking, remittance or contact details re-enters the same screening path.
Sub-contracted capacityWhen a carrier tenders to another carrier, the same fields are screened again one tier further down.
The stolen login is usually a load board, a broker portal or the carrier's own mailbox. All three are targeted with harvesting pages imitating the platform's sign-in screen, delivered by messages about expiring authority, insurance certificates needing re-upload, or a payment held pending verification.
The page is disposable and the hostname is fresh. The whole operation exists for a matter of days, which is exactly why a list built only from domains verified as currently resolving fits this threat better than an archive of everything ever reported.
So screen hostnames during vetting, not only at the mail gateway. A supplied website, certificate link or portal address can be batched through the check before a human opens the packet. It will not tell you a carrier is fraudulent; it will tell you at high confidence when a supplied hostname is already confirmed as harvesting credentials, which ends the review immediately.
Fold it into the job you already run. Brokers doing this at volume attach it to the same process that validates authority and insurance, so it lands as one more field on the vetting record rather than a separate tool a compliance clerk has to remember.
What the list actually is

Verified as live, rebuilt daily, matched wherever you choose to match it

The properties that matter to a logistics operator are not the ones usually marketed: freshness, verification standard, and whether the thing still works when a depot's uplink does not.

Inclusion requires an active A record, confirmed through rotating proxy infrastructure. That single rule changes the character of the list: it is not an accumulating archive of everything anybody ever reported, because hosts that stop resolving fall out. What remains — 390,000 or more domains at any given moment — is a picture of infrastructure that is standing up and answering right now, which for a sector whose adversaries register a hostname on Monday and abandon it on Friday is worth more than a bigger list that never forgets anything.

The changelog is the part operations teams care about. The rebuild completes daily at 04:30 UTC with a list of additions and removals alongside it, which turns the update from a full reload into a diff. A depot resolver applying a few thousand adds and removes finishes in a maintenance window measured in seconds; a full file replacement every morning is the kind of job that eventually collides with a peak-season change freeze.

Two delivery shapes, for two parts of the estate. The /feed endpoint hands you the whole database as CSV — domain,category,dns_status — or as JSON, with unlimited downloads on a subscription, so every depot and 3PL site can hold its own copy with no per-site metering. The /check and /batch endpoints suit workflow integration, where a specific set of hostnames needs a verdict inside a business process: a carrier packet, a settlement run, a customs document set.

Works when the line does not

A depot on a congested or failing uplink still resolves against a local copy of the list. There is no verdict service to be unreachable during the exact incident you needed it for.

Fits inside a tender flow

Sub-50ms responses and a rate limit of ten requests per second per key mean a check can sit inline in a booking or onboarding path without becoming the slowest step in it.

Answers are binary and auditable

Confidence is 0.98 for a confirmed match and 0.0 for no match — no middle band to interpret, which makes the result easy to record on a vetting file or a payment hold.

Placement

Where the check belongs in a carrier-to-cash workflow

Five points, in the order freight and money actually move. Each is a place where a verified hostname verdict changes a decision rather than merely generating a report.

1

Carrier packet intake

Every hostname on the submitted packet — website, certificate links, contact mail domains — batched in one call before a human opens the file.

2

Load tender & rate con

Links in tender and rate-confirmation traffic screened at the mail gateway, so a fake load-board or portal page never reaches the dispatcher's screen.

3

In-transit exceptions

Customs-charge, redelivery and detention notices are the highest-volume lure family in freight. Screen them where they arrive, including on the consignee side.

4

Detail-change requests

Any request to alter banking, remittance or contact details re-enters screening automatically, regardless of which mailbox it appears to come from.

5

Settlement release

The payment job batches the hostnames in the correspondence trail and holds the run on a confirmed match, rather than relying on a clerk to escalate.

Batch, do not loop. A hundred domains in one POST at one lookup each is far kinder to the ten-per-second rate limit than a hundred single calls, and the response returns checked, phishing_found and credits_used so the job can log one line per run.
Screen on change, not only at onboarding. A carrier vetted cleanly in March can present a different, hostile hostname in September. Periodic re-screening of vendor master data is where most of the value sits, and it is cheap because the record set is small.
The edge of the network

Drivers, depots and the devices nobody manages

Head-office controls do not reach the yard. The operational reality at the edge is personal phones, shared terminals and a site whose IT support is a phone number.

A driver's phone is the most exposed device in the whole estate and usually the least governed. It carries dispatch messages, delivery instructions, proof-of-delivery prompts, fuel-card notifications and increasingly telematics and hours-of-service alerts. In a large fleet some of that arrives through a managed app; for a small fleet or an owner-operator, all of it arrives as text messages and personal email on a handset the company neither owns nor administers.

If you already run DNS filtering, this is a list to load rather than a product to buy. The mechanics are on the DNS filtering page, and the firewall-side variant on firewall security.
The gap, stated rather than glossed: a driver's own phone on a cellular connection is not covered by anything you do at the site. For the road the realistic controls are the dispatch app's own link handling, called server-side before an external link opens, plus the blunt policy that no load, routing change or payment instruction is ever accepted on the strength of a text message alone.
Shared depot logins defeat attribution. When one operational account is used by every shift, a compromise cannot be traced, cannot be revoked without stopping the dock, and will not appear in any per-user alerting. Blocking the destination is the layer that still works when identity hygiene is impossible.

The distinction worth carrying into a management meeting: every other control in this industry asks somebody to notice something. A resolver holding a verified list of live hostile hosts asks nobody to notice anything — it simply removes the destination, at three in the morning, on a shift with agency staff, during peak, when nobody is watching.

Choosing the layer

Four places you could put this, and what each one actually buys

Most operators end up running two of them. The table is about being deliberate rather than accumulating tools by accident.

PlacementCoversMissesEffortCommercial shape
Site / depot resolver Every device on the site, including unmanaged ones Cellular traffic, devices using their own encrypted DNS Low — a scheduled download and a reload Feed subscription
Mail gateway Links in tenders, invoices, customs and exception notices Anything arriving by text, messaging app or in-app chat Medium — a hook into the existing scanning pipeline Feed for volume, batch API for sampling
Carrier / vendor onboarding Hostnames supplied on packets and change requests A legitimate carrier compromised later Low — a batch call inside an existing workflow Credit package
Payment release job The final gate before funds move Thread hijacking from a genuine, compromised mailbox Low — one call and one hold condition Credit package

The limitation, from the "misses" column

This is a known-bad lookup. A confirmed match means a hostname was observed, verified as resolving and confirmed as phishing infrastructure. A clean result means "not on the list" — never "safe". A domain registered this morning and first used this afternoon will not appear yet, and a compromised legitimate supplier never will, because their domain is not hostile.

Why the gap is narrower than it sounds

Freight-targeted phishing infrastructure is rarely bespoke. The same kits and hosting get reused across campaigns, so hostnames aimed at one broker on Tuesday are frequently in the database before they are aimed at another on Thursday. Weakest against a patient adversary building one domain for one target; strongest against the industrialised volume that fills a dispatcher's inbox.

The right mental model

A floor, not a ceiling. Resolver placement plus one workflow placement — vetting or settlement — covers the two failure modes that cost this industry most, and neither needs a security team day to day. Operators building further usually add incident response tooling and, once there is a SOC, the SIEM integration pattern.

Cost

What this costs a carrier, a broker and a global forwarder

Two spending shapes. One is small enough to sit inside an operations budget without a procurement cycle; the other is a network-wide subscription that does not move with your volume.

Workflow screening runs on credits

The record counts are small, so the arithmetic is too: a brokerage onboarding two hundred carriers a month and screening five hostnames per packet spends a thousand credits a month plus whatever the settlement job uses. the Growth plan is $99/month for 25,000 lookups at $0.0040 per lookup, $99 Growth is 25,000 , and $249 Professional is 100,000 at $0.0025 — a year or more of screening for most brokers. lookups reset monthlyfewer than ten percent have been used.

Network enforcement runs on the feed

The Daily Threat Feed is $499 per month or $499/month — a third off. It adds historical archive access, priority support, custom format options, a dedicated account manager and 100,000 API credits, which covers the vetting and settlement work above without a second purchase. Downloads are unlimited, so a forwarder with forty branch offices and a 3PL with sixty depots pay exactly what an operator with one site pays.

What an owner-operator should do instead

For a two-truck fleet neither figure is the right starting point and it would be silly to pretend otherwise. The realistic path is the one small carriers already use for compliance services: a group arrangement through an association, or the 3PL or broker they haul for running protection at network level on their behalf. If you are the larger party in a chain of small ones, extending your resolver to a partner site is a configuration line rather than another subscription.

Larger volumes and non-card payment

Monthly plans range from Business at $499/month for 250,000 lookups, $999/month for 750,000 lookups, Enterprise at $999/month for 750,000 lookups and Enterprise at $999/month for 750,000 lookups per lookup, and bank transfer replaces PayPal above $4,000 for finance functions that do not use cards. SFTP or S3 delivery into an existing pipeline, STIX/TAXII for a security operations centre, a custom update frequency, an SLA or on-premise deployment are quoted rather than listed — the full table is on the pricing page and delivery options on the daily feed page.

One note for the business case, without an invented figure attached. The costs this control addresses are lumpy rather than continuous — a diverted settlement, a load collected by a carrier who was not who they claimed to be, a depot disrupted by malware delivered through an exception notice. Any one of them exceeds a year of either spending shape, which is why the useful question in a board paper is not the expected saving but the number of settlement runs and carrier packets that currently pass through with no automated hostname check at all.

Start by measuring, not by blocking. Load the list at one site in log-only mode for a fortnight. The hit count from your own network is the number that survives a budget conversation; a vendor's figure is not.
The /stats endpoint requires no API key, no credits and no authentication. You can confirm the current database size and last update date before any commercial conversation begins. Full endpoint detail is in the API documentation.
Questions from operations

What dispatch, compliance and finance ask first

The objections below come up in nearly every conversation with a carrier, broker or forwarder, and most of them deserve a direct answer rather than reassurance.

We already have a mail security product. What does this add?

Two things. First, coverage of paths your mail product does not see: hostnames supplied on a carrier packet, links in a load-board message, a URL a dispatcher types from a phone call, a redelivery notice arriving at a depot's shared terminal. Second, a different verification standard — every domain here has been confirmed as currently resolving, so the list reflects live infrastructure rather than accumulated reports.

In short: a supplement, not a replacement. If your mail platform already blocks a domain, that is one fewer thing to worry about; where this matters is the freight-specific workflow paths that never touch the mail gateway at all.
Can this stop double-brokering?

Not on its own, and anyone claiming otherwise is overselling. Double-brokering is a fraud committed with a stolen or fabricated operating identity, and stopping it requires authority verification, insurance validation, carrier history and often a phone call to a number you sourced independently.

What it does contribute: one high-confidence data point early in that process — whether a hostname the applicant supplied (their website, a certificate link, a portal address, the domain in their contact addresses) is a confirmed credential-harvesting host. When it is, the review ends there. It also addresses the upstream step, because the stolen login that made the fraud possible was frequently harvested on a page whose hostname is in this database.
Our depots have poor connectivity. Will this work?

This is the case the feed model exists for. You download the full database once a day — a single authenticated call to /feed, CSV or JSON — and every subsequent match happens locally on your own resolver or firewall. Nothing is asked of an external service at lookup time, so a site with a saturated or intermittent uplink still gets the full benefit.

Practically: schedule the pull shortly after the 04:30 UTC build, validate the file before it replaces the live one, and alert if the file is older than forty-eight hours. A silently stale list is the only realistic way this deployment degrades, and one age check catches it.
What happens when it blocks something our operation actually needs?

Plan for it and it is a non-event. Keep a local allow-list that your reload script applies after each daily import, so an override survives the next update rather than having to be re-applied. Make the block page say which organisation blocked it and give a route to a person, because a dispatcher who hits a false positive at 06:00 needs it resolved in minutes, not raised as a ticket.

On the rate itself: verification by active DNS resolution keeps false positives low, because a domain has to be confirmed as live hostile infrastructure to be included at all — but no list is perfect, and the quality of your correction path matters more than the error rate.
Does the API key need to go into our driver app?

No, and it must not. The API key is the username chosen at registration and it is a server-side secret. If it ships inside a mobile app it can be extracted from the binary, and whoever does so is spending your credits.

The correct pattern: a small endpoint of your own. The app asks your backend about a URL, your backend calls the check, caches the answer briefly and returns a verdict. That also gives you somewhere to apply your own allow-list and to log what drivers are actually being sent, which is operationally useful in its own right.
We are a customs broker. Does this help with clearance-fee lures?

It helps with the hostname, which is the part of that lure that is mechanically checkable. Messages claiming an outstanding duty or clearance fee on a real shipment are among the most productive attacks in international freight, because the underlying event is plausible and the recipient often cannot verify the charge quickly through any other channel.

What it will not do: validate whether a charge is genuine. Screening hostnames in inbound clearance correspondence catches the hosts already confirmed as harvesting infrastructure; whether the duty is real remains a process question answered against your own entry records, and no domain list will ever answer it for you.
How current is the list, and what does a result look like?

The database is rebuilt every 24 hours, with the build landing at 04:30 UTC, and each domain is DNS-verified through rotating proxy infrastructure so only hosts with an active A record are included. That standard is why entries fall out when they stop resolving instead of accumulating indefinitely.

A response carries is_phishing, a category of phishing/malware, a dns_status of resolves, a last_checked date, and a confidence of 0.98 for a confirmed match against 0.0 for no match. There is no partial score in between, which makes the result straightforward to act on in an automated workflow — a hold or a pass, not a judgement call.
We have no IT staff at all. Is this realistic for us?

If you run your own resolver, or a firewall with a blocklist feature, it is an afternoon's work for whoever maintains that box: a scheduled download, a file validity check, a reload. If you do not, the honest answer is that the feed is not the right starting point for you.

Two realistic routes for a small carrier: the workflow route — a monthly plan and a batch call in whatever system already handles your carrier packets or payment runs, which a bookkeeping or TMS integrator can wire up in a few hours — or leaning on the larger party in your chain, because if you haul for a broker or 3PL already operating this at network level, extending it to your site costs them a configuration line.

Put a verified hostname check in front of the money and the cargo

Screen carrier packets and settlement runs with a monthly plan, or load the daily feed into the resolvers serving your depots, offices and 3PL sites so every device inherits the same protection without an agent.